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Voting for History: One Person, One 
Vote and the Creation of National 
Register Historic Districts 
Jonathan Stark-Sachs* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a fundamental principle of our democratic society that the 
right to vote is enjoyed by citizens, not “trees or acres,” “not farms 
or cities or economic interests.”1  So important is this fundamental 
interest that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires courts to examine with the utmost scrutiny 
the possible debasement of a citizen’s right to vote.2  Not only does 
the right to vote require guarantees of free and unimpaired access 
to the polls, but also that each eligible citizen’s vote be counted with 
the same weight as every other’s, irrespective of race, sex, creed, or 
even wealth.3  The requirement of “one person, one vote” was 
instantiated in a line of United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that extended the principle to the most local level of 
governments and elections,4 recognizing that no election is so 
unimportant as to justify the disenfranchisement or franchise 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2021;
Candidate for Master of Science in Historic Preservation, Roger Williams
University, 2022; B.A., Emporia State University, 2016.  Thank you to Dr.
Christopher J. Ryan, Professor Diana Hassel, Dr. Justin Kishbaugh, and Kelly
Fanizzo for the helpful comments, guidance, and assistance.
1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 562, 568.
4. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1968).
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dilution of those who wish to lend their voice to the democratic 
process.5  
The Court, however, recognized that there were limited 
circumstances in which the adaptability of democratic mechanisms 
to uniquely localized needs was necessary to provide for the 
functions of local governments and allowed escape from the 
strictures of the “one person, one vote” principle.6  Professor 
Richard Briffault termed this model of local election the 
“proprietary” model because the Court cemented this model in an 
analogy to “the voting arrangements of a private corporation or a 
cooperative.”7 
The National Park Service (NPS) has proposed a rule change 
to modify the objection process for the nomination of historic 
districts to the National Register of Historic Places (National 
Register).8  In addition to the existing majority landowner 
standard, this proposed rule would provide an alternative standard 
that values each property owner’s vote to object to the listing of the 
proposed historic district based on the “land area” that they own 
within it.9  Diluting smaller property owner’s votes in this objection 
process would violate the guarantees of “one person, one vote” 
unless it could be found that elections for National Register historic 
districts were of the type that did not require its application. 
However, the land-area voting scheme proposed by the NPS 
has fundamental differences to the kind of election that justified 
departure from “one person, one vote.”  Firstly, the foundation of 
the proprietary model rests on principles of federalism that promote 
adaptability in local government, and, as such, a federal agency 
utilizing this model runs counter to the core distinctions justifying 
its creation.  Furthermore, the proposed rule invades spheres of 
5. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 55 (1970).
6. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 727–28 (1973) (quoting Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 
(1970)). 
7. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and
Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 365–66, 369–70 (1993).  The Court 
explicitly justified the use of this model on an election for a local government 
body because it was “essentially a business enterpris[e].”  See Ball v. James, 
451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981). 
8. See National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996 (proposed
Mar. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
9. See id. at 6998.
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traditional state sovereignty and potentially runs afoul of discrete 
federalism-based doctrines the Court has announced.  Secondly, 
even if applying federal control over local elections in this manner 
is proper, the broad and egalitarian interests of the voters in 
National Register historic district elections do not meet the 
guidelines the Court has provided that make use of the proprietary 
model permissible.  As such, these elections must remain on a 
substantially “one person, one vote” basis. 
This Comment discusses the historical and regulatory 
background of National Register historic districts and how the 
proposed voting scheme would fit within the Court’s “one person, 
one vote” jurisprudence.  Part I examines the importance of historic 
districts as a historic preservation tool and the regulatory 
framework of the National Register.  Part II discusses the 
jurisprudence that gave rise to the two models of local elections. 
Part III argues that, despite some differences in the voting process 
for National Register historic districts, they are, nonetheless actual 
elections; examines the federalism-based underpinnings of the 
proprietary model of local elections and its implications on this 
voting scheme; and further argues that these elections are entitled 
to “one person, one vote” protections.  The conclusion of this 
Comment underscores these fundamental differences and 
demonstrates that the elections must adhere to the traditional 
democratic model. 
I. THE NATIONAL REGISTER AND HISTORIC DISTRICTS
The National Register defines a historic district as a 
“geographically definable area, urban or rural, possessing a 
significant concentration, linkage, or continuity of sites, buildings, 
structures, or objects united by past events or aesthetically by plan 
or physical development.”10  As of 2018, the National Register 
includes over ten thousand historic districts.11  National Register 
historic districts, and historic districts in general, occupy a unique 
and important place in the historic preservation landscape, yet they 
are also complicated by the diverse interests of the property owners 
within the district.  To account for these interests, the National 
10. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(d) (2019).
11. NORMAN TYLER, ILENE R. TYLER & TED J. LIGIBEL, HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 73 
(3d ed. 2018). 
202 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:199 
Register regulations provide private property owners within the 
proposed historic district the opportunity to object to the listing in 
a local referendum.12  The current regulations adhere closely to the 
“one person, one vote” principle and, as such, reflect popular ideals 
of democratic equality.13  
A. Importance of Historic Districts
Historic districts are unique because they have not only the
potential to preserve a place but also frame preservation on a 
neighborhood scale by establishing a sense of place as well.  One of 
the most important aspects of understanding and appreciating 
history is context.  Indeed, one of the factors when assessing the 
historical significance of a potential listing and its corresponding 
integrity is its setting.14  While the setting and surroundings are 
certainly to be considered in a single property listing, in a historic 
district, the association of the constituent parts and the resulting 
unity of the historical narrative is paramount.15  By widening the 
scope of historic preservation, historic districts emphasize the 
importance of urban and societal orientation that can be lost when 
focusing on a single resource. 
Although the focus on distilling a certain historical period 
typifies many historic districts and necessitates the selection of a 
certain history over others, historic districts also represent a 
potential to incorporate broader historical narratives.16  It is 
undeniable that urban landscapes continue to evolve, and while 
some historic districts pride themselves on representing high-style 
12. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.6(g) (2019).
13. See Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 275, 278–81 (2010) (noting that where local direct democracy decisions
are made on a “one person, one vote” basis, the result has greater democratic
legitimacy and fairness given that conflicting values inevitably result in
winners and losers.).
14. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 97.  “Integrity” is the lens through which
a nomination is viewed to determine whether the property is still capable of 
effectively conveying the historical significance that qualifies it for the 
National Register.  See infra note 36. 
15. See DAVID A. HAMER, HISTORY IN URBAN PLACES: THE HISTORIC 
DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 35 (1998). 
16. See id. at 26.  “Within a total city context, historic districts can preserve
a sense of the architectural and historical continuum of the life of that city, 
even if one district viewed in isolation may appear to be confined artificially to 
just one era.”  Id.  
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architecture, historic districts can also encompass diverse resources 
that display a frenetic urban narrative.17  In addition, as the field 
of historic preservation itself continues to shift focus to 
representing the full American experience, historic districts will 
undoubtedly play a role in interpreting overlooked resources.18  
Whether by conforming to existing aesthetics or by incorporating 
diverse buildings into the greater chronology of the city, historic 
districts are a unique catalyst and building block in the evolution 
of their urban setting. 
Beyond their importance to aesthetic concerns and urban 
growth, historic districts can also provide a vehicle for effective city 
planning and cultivating social capital.  Urban historic districts are 
singularly positioned to take advantage of state and federal tax 
incentive programs because they both encompass a variety of 
resources and often have the potential for mixed-use commercial 
redevelopment targeted by such programs.19  Likewise, historic 
districts have the potential to benefit property values by appealing 
to those who appreciate a historic aesthetic or a more walkable 
neighborhood.20  Above all, historic districts enable communities to 
breathe new life into entire neighborhoods through finding 
continuing uses for “vacant, unused, or underutilized historic 
buildings” by incentivizing new commercial developments and 
creating a renewed tax base.21  Critics argue that the benefits of 
historic districts may not outweigh the costs, that historic 
preservation is used as a pretext to gentrify and exclude low-income 
residents, and that it blocks much needed development in urban 
areas, but the consensus remains that historic districts are 
17. See Robin Elisabeth Datel, Preservation and a Sense of Orientation for
American Cities, 75 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 125, 128 (1985). 
18. See Adam Lovelady, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and
the Role of Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 40 URBAN LAW. 147, 149–51 
(2008). 
19. See Datel, supra note 17, at 132.  The Federal Rehabilitation Tax
Credit in particular requires that the property be income-producing.  See TYLER 
ET AL., supra note 11, at 306. 
20. See TYLER ET AL, supra note 11, at 302−03.
21. Id. at 302.
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beneficial to the aesthetic, communal, and economic fabric of 
neighborhoods.22 
The historic preservation profession has recognized the many 
benefits of historic districts and has increasingly moved toward 
preserving historic resources on a neighborhood scale.23  Indeed, 
the historic district is arguably the marquee tool for achieving the 
goal of using “structures and objects of the past to establish the 
values of time and place” that catalyzed the modern preservation 
movement.24  Although the most pronounced of these benefits 
result from local historic districts, with their stronger regulatory 
power,25 the National Register and its nomination process provide 
for a uniform program that can help facilitate local historic districts’ 
creation and provides for its own attendant benefits.26 
B. The National Register and the Nomination Process
The National Register was created as part of the National
Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA) and functions as a list of 
heretofore recognized historic resources.27  It also provides a 
process to determine what is and what is not considered historically 
significant and therefore deserving of recognition and 
preservation.28  Although the National Register is a federally 
funded program overseen by the NPS, it is largely administered by 
State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPO) in each state29 and fits 
a model of “cooperative federalism.”30 
22. See Alexander Kazam, From Independence Hall to the Strip Mall:
Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to Historic Preservation, 47 ENVTL. L. 429, 432–
34 (2017). 
23. See HAMER, supra note 15, at 136−39.
24. See Datel, supra note 17, at 125 (quoting UNITED STATES CONFERENCE
OF MAYORS, WITH HERITAGE SO RICH 207 (1966)). 
25. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (establishing that the
regulation of aesthetics was permissible as part of a state’s police power to 
promote the health, safety, and welfare of its communities). 
26. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 144.
27. See id. at 70.
28. See id. at 70–71, 77−80, 95–97.
29. See id. at 77–78.  On tribal land the program may be overseen by a
Tribal Historic Preservation Officer or THPO.  See id. at 79. 
30. See ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM 209–10 (2011).  Cooperative
federalism provides for state implementation of federal programs, subject to 
minimum federally-proscribed requirements.  Id. 
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The NHPA and the establishment of the National Register 
represented a paradigm shift in how historic preservation 
functioned in the United States.  Previous preservation efforts were 
largely led by volunteer organizations, and previous legislation 
protecting cultural resources was much more limited in scope.31  
The National Register sought a more holistic approach to expand 
the types of resources that could be recognized federally.32  Indeed, 
the NHPA was the first federal act that allowed for the designation 
of historic districts.33  In addition to the nationally significant 
properties already recognized under previous laws, the National 
Register also allowed for the inclusion of properties of state and 
local significance, opening the door for a more comprehensive and 
widespread program.34  To be listed, however, a property must first 
go through the National Register’s nomination process. 
1. The Current Nomination Process
Any party may prepare a nomination for a property’s inclusion
on the National Register even without the owner’s knowledge or 
consent.35  In each state, the SHPO evaluates the nomination under 
the National Register criteria for historic significance and may 
officially nominate the property.36  The SHPO is also responsible 
for overseeing the majority of the ensuing process.37  Although the 
National Register originally did not require owner consent for a 
31. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 37–40, 42, 50.
32. See BARRY MACKINTOSH, NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT AND 
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: A HISTORY 20–22 (1986). 
33. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 72–73.  The National Register also
encompasses “districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in 
American history, architecture, archeology, engineering and culture.”  36 
C.F.R. § 60.1(a) (2019).
34. See MACKINTOSH, supra note 32, at 21.
35. See id. at 45, 48.
36. To be listed, all nominations must show historical significance through
one or more of four criteria: (a) association with important events, (b) 
association with important persons, (c) architectural or artistic merit, or (d) 
potential to yield important information in prehistory or history.  36 C.F.R. § 
60.4 (2019).  In addition, a nomination is evaluated to determine whether the 
property can properly convey that historic significance through “integrity” of 
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association.  
TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 97. 
37. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 109−10.
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property to be listed,38 the NHPA and regulations now provide that 
the property owner must be notified and have the opportunity to 
object to the nomination.39 
If a property owner objects to the nomination, then the 
property will be evaluated for eligibility for inclusion in the 
National Register, but will not be listed unless the objection is 
withdrawn.40  For historic districts, a nomination will not be listed 
if the majority of the property owners within the proposed district 
object.41  Each property owner has “one vote regardless of how 
many properties or what part of one property that party owns and 
regardless of whether the property contributes to the significance 
of the district.”42  The one landowner, one vote election was selected 
because it was the “most reasonable and legally defensible” manner 
to consider property owner objections.43 
Property owners are often concerned that the listing of their 
property on the National Register will result in a legal restriction 
placed upon their property, and therefore, object to the listing.44  
Listing on the National Register, however, does not automatically 
impose any restrictions on the property; the owner is still free to 
modify or even demolish their historic property.45  Some states and 
38. MACKINTOSH, supra note 32, at 45.
39. See 54 U.S.C. § 302105(b) (2014); National Register of Historic Places,
36 C.F.R. § 60.6(c), (g) (2019).  The SHPO will obtain a list of property owners 
to notify based on either the official land records or tax records.  36 C.F.R. § 
60.6(c) (2019).  Property owners who wish to object are required to submit a 
notarized statement to the SHPO certifying that they are the sole or partial 
property owner.  Id. at § 60.6(g). 
40. 36 C.F.R. § 60.6(s) (2019).
41. Id. at § 60.6(g).  It is the responsibility of the SHPO to “ascertain”
whether the majority of property owners have objected.  Id. 
42. Id.
43. National Register of Historic Places, 46 Fed. Reg. 56183, 56186 (Nov.
16, 1981). 
44. See TYLER, supra note 11, at 110.
45. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.2(a) (2019).  The listing of a property on, or a
determination of eligibility for, the National Register does afford consideration 
of effects to the property stemming from federally funded or permitted 
undertakings through the Section 106 process of the NHPA, which could also 
potentially involve a reliance on private funds where the property owner 
himself seeks federal benefits.  See id.; see also MACKINTOSH, supra note 32, at 
45. Listing also disincentivizes the demolition of the property by making it
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localities have set up complementary programs that result in a 
simultaneous listing on a state register,46 which, in turn, may come 
with some property restrictions.47  Yet, these decisions are made at 
the state and local level with greater opportunity for self-
determination and do not implicate these restrictions on the 
National Register program.  In essence, National Register status is 
an honorific that can come with considerable benefits to the 
property owners and communities in which those properties are 
located but carries no per se impairments on those property owners 
who do not support its preservation purpose.  
Whether the property owner supports, objects, or remains 
silent on the nomination, if the SHPO determines that the property 
may be eligible, the nomination then proceeds to the accompanying 
state review board for further evaluation.48  Once approved at the 
state level, the application is then sent to the Keeper of the National 
Register, under the auspices of the Secretary of the Interior, who 
reviews the application.49  If the Keeper of the National Register 
agrees with the state review board, the nomination becomes 
officially listed on the National Register and is published in the 
Federal Register, or, if the property owner(s) object, there is only a 
determination of eligibility.50  Under the proposed voting scheme, 
this objection process will largely remain the same, but by valuing 
each landowner’s vote in proportion to the land area that they 
control, it brings into question the fundamental democratic equality 
of the election. 
2. Proposed Land-Area Voting Scheme
The proposed regulatory changes to the National Register
program were prompted in part by the 2016 amendments to the 
NHPA, but the land-area voting scheme was not related to the 
ineligible for certain tax benefits for demolishing historic buildings otherwise 
available but does not prevent the demolition itself.  See § 60.2(c). 
46. Sara C. Bronin & Ryan Rowberry, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 66 (2d ed. 2018). 
47. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 127–28.
48. Id. at 109.  State review boards are comprised of experts in various
professions including history, architectural history, historic architecture, 
archaeology, and other related disciplines.  36 C.F.R. § 60.3(o) (2019). 
49. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 109.
50. Id.
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amendments.51  In fact, the NHPA provision providing for 
landowner objection remained unchanged and provides only for 
objection by a “majority of the [property] owners.”52  Yet, in addition 
to the existing objection criteria, the proposed rule would allow for 
a nomination to be blocked on objection of “the owners of a majority 
of the land area.”53  Although the language does not explicitly value 
a property owner’s vote based off the land area that they own, such 
is the natural consequence of the rule.  If this rule were to be 
adopted, then those with the largest land holdings within the 
district could veto the National Register nomination over the 
majority of smaller landowners whose franchise has been diluted 
by the rule.54 
The NPS contends that the land-area voting scheme will 
“further emphasize the rights of private property owners within a 
proposed historic district.”55  While this may be true for larger 
landowners, it is most certainly not true for their smaller neighbors. 
This rule would subordinate the rights of one private property 
owner under another.  Furthermore, assuming (as is necessary 
because of the scant justifications given) that this change is meant 
to remedy unwanted listing where state law creates burdensome 
restrictions,56 the provision would be over-inclusive because it 
51. National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996 (proposed Mar.
1, 2019). There are other concerning proposed changes and potential 
administrative deficiencies within the proposed rule change that are outside of 
the scope of this Comment.  See generally National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, Comment Letter on National Park Service Proposed Rule for the 
National Register of Historic Places (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-2019-0001-3286 
[https://perma.cc/XJW4-U47Y] [hereinafter National Trust Comment]. 
52. 54 U.S.C. § 302105(b) (2014) (emphasis added).
53. National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996, 7002 (proposed
Mar. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 60(g)). 
54. See National Trust Comment, supra note 51, at 5.
55. Proposed Regulations on the Listing of Properties in the National
Register of Historic Places, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/historicpreservation/nhparegs2019.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZHY3-9AA5] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
56. See infra note 151.  The land-area voting scheme may also be justified
on a general sense of fairness.  It is only logical (as the argument would likely 
go) that the owners representing the majority of the land in a proposed historic 
district should govern the outcome, just as the overall majority of landowners 
could do, because they have more gross ownership or “shares” of the land 
(whether that be square feet, acres, etc.).  The definition of “fairness,” however, 
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provides a nationwide rule to a myriad of state contexts⎯even 
where such restrictions are absent.  As a result, larger landowners 
would nevertheless be favored over their less-land-rich neighbors 
without the justifiable concerns over property restrictions.  Because 
of the potential constitutional problems with the proposed voting 
scheme, it must be viewed with the Court’s jurisprudence on 
limiting a citizen’s franchise. 
II. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
The Supreme Court first distilled the “one person, one vote” 
principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Reynolds v. Sims.57  In its decision, the Court 
articulated that the right to vote must be enjoyed by all similarly 
situated citizens, and that vote must have substantially equal 
weight on the outcome of the election.58  Furthermore, because the 
right to vote is “preservative of other basic civil and political rights,” 
can differ based on what proverbial yardstick is used, as will be seen in the 
differing results on application of the democratic or proprietary model.  See 
infra Part II.  Assuming that one adheres to the more specific ideal of 
“democratic fairness,” the idea that those with greater relative wealth in the 
form of land can dictate the result over a majority of their individual neighbors 
is anything but fair⎯and is more akin to feudalism.  See source cited infra note 
151.  
57. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).  While Reynolds and its
progeny exclusively apply the “one person, one vote” principle to state 
elections, it equally applies to the federal government through the guarantee 
of equal protection implicit in the Fifth Amendment of the United States’ 
Constitution.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954); see also 
Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 
N.C. L. REV. 541, 543 (1977) (demonstrating a general rule of congruence in the
equal protection guarantees afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments subject only to limited exceptions based on unique federal
functions).  Although there are other federal elections, namely those for United
States Senate, that do not comport with the “one person, one vote” principle,
Reynolds itself rejected the “so-called federal analogy” in state elections.  See
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574–76.  The Court concluded that the unique historical
concerns surrounding our nation’s foundational compact and the state
sovereignty concessions necessary to achieve it were a deviation from basic
democratic principles of fairness.  Id.  As such, the “one person, one vote”
principle is inapplicable to some federal elections not because they are federal,
but because they are so described in the Constitution.  See id. at 574.
58. Id.  “The right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of
the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise.”  Id. at 555. 
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the Court must strictly scrutinize any infringement of that right.59  
Therefore, to justify an unequal franchise, the government must 
demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in tailoring voting 
requirements and it narrowly tailored the election to achieve that 
end.60  While the “one person, one vote” principle was first applied 
to malapportionment in state legislative districts for federal and 
state office, the Court soon applied the principle to the local 
context.61 
A. Local General-Purpose Governments and Elections
Avery v. Midland County was the first case to extend the “one
person, one vote” principle to local governments.62  Avery reviewed 
the constitutionality of the voting system for the Midland County 
Commissioners Court, which was elected from single-member 
districts of vastly unequal population.63  The Court found that in 
applying the “one person, one vote” principle, it was not relevant 
what functions were exercised; rather, the relevant factor was that 
the Commission had “authority to make a substantial number of 
decisions that affect all citizens.”64  However, while the “one person, 
one vote” principle applied to local governments with general 
powers, it left the door open for localities to “devis[e] mechanisms 
of local government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving 
local problems.”65  Yet, in the wake of Avery, it was unclear where 
59. Id. at 562.
60. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969).
61. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 345–46.
62. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479 (1968).
63. Id. at 475–76.  The three rural districts had a combined population of
2,094 whereas the single urban district had a population of 67,906.  Id. 
64. See id. at 482–84.  The argument that the “one person, one vote”
principle applied only to sufficiently legislative bodies stemmed from Sailors 
v. Board of Education, where, while assuming arguendo that “one person, one
vote” applied to local governments, the Court noted that the county board
functioned in a more “administrative” than “legislative” capacity but stressed
that the board positions were appointed by its constituent local boards rather
than from a direct vote.  387 U.S. 105, 110 (1967).  The Court in Avery opined
that Sailors fit into the new local paradigm they had created, as an example of
their sympathies to local innovation, yet discounted the argument that the
Commissioners Court was “not sufficiently legislative.”  See Avery, 390 U.S. at
482, 485 (internal quotations omitted).
65. See id. at 485.  The governmental powers that the Commissioners
Court wielded included setting a tax rate, equalizing assessments, issuing 
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the proper context for such a “special-purpose unit of government” 
that justified departure from “one person, one vote,” would 
emerge.66 
The cases immediately following Avery further extended “one 
person, one vote” to special government units and elections that 
seemingly corresponded to only nominal general governmental 
powers, including elections for local bond referenda67 and 
educational boards.68  Nevertheless, because these elections had 
the potential to affect those who had been disenfranchised, the 
Court found that they contravened the “one person, one vote” 
principle.69  
In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, the Court examined a 
referendum to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds 
that excluded otherwise qualified voters who did not own real 
property.70  The Court rejected that property owners bore a “special 
burden” and assumed that costs would inevitably be passed on to 
residents in the community.71  Therefore, “[p]resumptively, when 
all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental 
decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit 
weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from 
the franchise.”72  Due to the presumption against interference with 
a non-property owner’s franchise and the lack of a convincing 
showing that property owners interests were sufficiently “different 
from the interests of non[-]property owners,” the Court found the 
exclusion in violation of “one person, one vote.”73 
By extending “one person, one vote” to bond referenda, the 
Court rejected the idea that the principle applied only to 
bonds, and setting a budget for the allocation of the county’s funds.  See id. at 
483. 
66. See id. at 483–84.
67. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1970);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702–03 (1969). 
68. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 52–3 (1970); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969). 
69. See, e.g., City of Phoenix, 399 U.S. at 215–18; Kramer, 395 U.S. at 630–
31. 
70. City of Phoenix, 399 U.S. at 205–06.
71. See id. at 208–12.
72. See id. at 209.
73. See id. at 212–13.
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representative elections and, instead, held that it also governed 
direct democracy.74  Furthermore, even if the outcome placed a 
direct pecuniary burden on a certain voting class, the secondary 
effects on public services and community-wide costs were sufficient 
to place the disfavored citizens on equal footing in the election.75 
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, the Court 
reviewed an election process for local school district boards that 
excluded voters who did not own or lease real property within the 
district or did not have custody of a child enrolled in the local public 
schools.76  While the Court reserved judgment on whether limiting 
franchise to those “primarily interested” was a compelling state 
interest, it held that the restriction improperly defined voter’s 
interests and excluded those who were civically “interested” in local 
education.77  This conceptualization did not rest only on pecuniary 
interests but allowed for a more subjective rationale of interest that 
included the voter’s specific viewpoint on the outcome of the 
election.78  Additionally, the Court elaborated that this exacting 
standard of scrutiny was triggered whenever the forum chose the 
democratic method, even where another method would be 
permissible.79 
Although the Court did not narrowly define what type of 
mechanism would allow an election to differentiate the interests of 
voters, it did provide for a powerful statement on democracy as a 
tool for gauging community concern.80  A democratic system does 
not allow for those who are indifferent to the issues implicated in a 
local election to have a greater say than those who are informed and 
passionate about the outcome without meeting a discerning 
standard.81 
74. See id. at 215 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 209–11 (majority opinion).
76. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622.
77. See id. at 630–31.
78. See id. at 631.
79. See id. at 629.  “[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. (quoting Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 665 (1966)). 
80. See id.
81. See id. at 633.
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Likewise, in Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan 
Kansas City, the Court invalidated the election scheme for a junior 
college district’s six-member board of trustees based on districts of 
unequal population.82  While not vested with the general powers 
exercised in Avery, the Court nevertheless found the board’s powers 
broad enough to require adherence to the “one person, one vote” 
principle.83  Because the election concerned education, which was a 
traditional local government function, it lent credence to the wide 
impact on excluded voters.84  Furthermore, it was not permissible 
to limit strict scrutiny only to “important” elections because the fact 
that an election was the chosen method of decision-making is “a 
strong indication that the choice is an important one.”85 
Hadley provided a useful tool in the calculus of deciding 
whether the election required equal franchise power by looking to 
whether the governmental functions related to the election were 
novel or those that local governments of general powers typically 
exercise.86  Hadley also underscored the importance of elections as 
a constitutionally protected method of decision-making that does 
not allow any stratification by attempting to determine which types 
of decisions were more important than others.87 
Avery and the “one person, one vote” cases that immediately 
followed demonstrated that strict scrutiny was necessary not 
because of the “‘subject’ of the election, but because of the fact of an 
election.”88  Those cases presumed that the vote would affect all 
otherwise eligible voters in important ways, even where the burden 
of or primary interest in the election seemingly fell more heavily on 
those granted greater franchise.89  While the trend following Avery 
seemed increasingly to extend the “one person, one vote” principle 
to special-purpose districts and elections, the Court also 
consistently acknowledged that it did not wish to place “roadblocks 
82. Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 51–52 (1970).
83. See id. at 53–54.
84. See id. at 56.
85. See id. at 55.
86. See id. at 56.
87. See id.at 55.
88. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 354 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969)) (emphasis added). 
89. See id. at 359.
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in the path of innovation, experiment, and development” generally 
afforded local governments under the federal system.90  Making 
good on this promise, the Court soon found occasion to explore a 
model of election for a business-like special purpose district that 
allowed escape from the strict scrutiny of “one person, one vote.” 
B. Special Limited-Purpose Districts
In Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District, the Court found a district of “special limited purpose and 
. . . disproportionate effect” on a favored group that justified escape 
from the strictures of “one person, one vote.”91  The Court examined 
elections for the board of directors of a water storage district, where 
the franchise was restricted to landowners within the district and 
votes were apportioned according the assessed valuation of the 
land.92  The water district financed and operated storage works 
within the district, which were assessed against the land therein in 
accordance with the benefits to be received, and tolls were charged 
for the use of the water.93  The district offered no general public 
services, such as schools, transportation, utilities, or infrastructure, 
that would widely impact all residents of the district.94  Therefore, 
because the “the benefits and burdens to each landowner . . . [were] 
in proportion to the assessed value of the land[,]” there was a 
rational basis for the state to value votes in this manner.95 
By departing from strict scrutiny, which governed previous 
local voting cases, the Court created an entirely new model for local 
90. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968); see also
Hadley, 397 U.S. 50, 59  (“[V]iable local governments may need many 
innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, [and] great 
flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.”) 
(quoting Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967))). 
91. Slayer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 728 (1973). 
92. Id. at 724–25.
93. Id. at 723–24, 729.
94. Id. at 728–29.  However, the water district did have the power to
employ workers, condemn private properties, and authorize both general 
obligation bonds (the kind extended “one person, one vote” protection in City of 
Phoenix) and interest-bearing warrants.  Id. at 728 n.7.  Furthermore, the 
water district engaged in flood control activities that had the potential to affect 
all residents, but the Court found this “incidental” to the “primary purpose” of 
water acquisition, storage, and distribution.  Id. at 728 n.8. 
95. Id. at 734.
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elections justified by comparing voter franchise to shares in a 
private corporation.96  This proprietary model of local election was 
not express, but instead outlined an emerging analysis that allowed 
the Court to create a unique carveout for local elections to exercise 
the kind of adaptability favored under the federal system.97  The 
Court further expanded on the understanding of this new model for 
local elections in Ball v. James.98 
In Ball, the Court reviewed another water district election for 
which votes were restricted to landowners, but, unlike in Sayler, 
this water district apportioned the franchise based on the acreage 
owned.99  This water district had similar functions to the one in 
Salyer, though it encompassed a substantial amount of urban land 
and also sold hydroelectric power to hundreds of thousands of 
people.100  Nevertheless, the Court found that the water district 
“simply does not exercise the sort of governmental powers that 
invoke the strict demands” of “one person, one vote.”101  Even 
though the district’s electricity sales did widely effect all those 
within the district, the court found that this was not an exercise of 
a traditional government function necessitating “one person, one 
vote” because the power service was merely incidental to the 
primary purpose of the water district.102  Instead, the Court viewed 
the water district as “essentially a business enterpris[e] . . . created 
by and chiefly benefitting a specific group of landowners.”103 
As an elaboration of the electoral model created in Salyer, Ball 
makes explicit the Court’s reliance on designating the election as 
one for an essentially proprietary entity.104  In Ball, the Court 
greatly expanded the scope of the proprietary model by allowing the 
initial formation and structure of the district to outweigh the wide 
96. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 365.
97. See id. at 366, 381.
98. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 357 (1981).
99. Id. at 359.
100. Id. at 357.  While the water district in Salyer had only seventy-seven
residents, the water district at issue in Ball included “almost half the 
population of the State.”  Id. at 365. 
101. Id. at 366.
102. See id. at 368–69.
103. Id. at 368.
104. See id.
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impact on excluded voters by the later assumed public utility 
function.105  The Court noted that to secure the initial buy-in of 
larger landowners for the creation of the district, the investment 
risk required a proportional control of the water district, and the 
unequal franchise continued to be relevant to its primary 
function.106   
Unfortunately, neither Ball nor Salyer clearly delineated the 
analysis by which this model of local election escaped from strict 
judicial scrutiny, leaving lower courts and scholars unsure of the 
legal framework by which to distinguish the democratic model from 
the proprietary model.107  The two factors that the Court did 
provide in distinguishing the two models were (1) the 
disproportionate impact on those favored by the voting scheme and 
(2) the special limited purpose of the district.108  Even in analyzing
the traditional functions of the water district in Ball, the Court
ignored its statement from Salyer that utilities are the type that
require adherence to “one person, one vote.”109  Furthermore,
rather than using these criteria to show a compelling need to tailor
local elections,110 as the Court could have done, it instead used
them to justify a less discerning review, abandoning the
presumptions of wide impact in City of Phoenix and broad
conceptualization of citizen interest in Kramer.111
III. NATIONAL REGISTER ELECTIONS UNDER “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE”
While National Register historic districts occupy a unique and
important place in the federal government’s historic preservation 
policy, it is not clear where and how the objection process for 
105. See id. at 371.
106. See id.
107. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 370.
108. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 370.
109. See id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973)). 
110. The local voting cases leading up to Salyer, and their frequent
invocation of the importance of innovation for local elections, suggest a 
willingness to declare a compelling government interest.  See supra note 90 
and accompanying text.  When the time finally came, the court did not do so, 
but instead established these proprietary needs as a complete exception to 
strict scrutiny.  See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728. 
111. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 362.
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National Register historic districts fits into the “one person, one 
vote” paradigms established in the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate to what extent the objection 
process resembles the elections previously examined, both under 
the existing democratic and proprietary models, as well as certain 
fundamental differences due to the federal nature of the election 
involved here. 
A. National Register Historic District Objections Function as an
Election
Although there are clear differences in the impetus and 
procedure that make up the objection process for National Register 
historic districts from traditional local elections, the procedure is 
an election by its very nature.  As recognized under the democratic 
model line of cases, where a democratic method is selected to render 
the underlying decision, certain constitutional voting protections 
and presumptions attach.112 These protections cannot be 
ameliorated simply by an attempt to demonstrate that the decision 
is less important than more traditional representative elections—
the fact that an election was chosen proves that the decision is an 
important one.113  Furthermore, even if the decision to list a historic 
district on the National Register is an “administrative” one, the 
Court has disavowed such distinctions as being sufficient by 
themselves to justify a departure from “one person, one vote” 
protections.114 
Neither is there any reason to view the manner in which the 
objection process for National Register historic districts is 
formulated as rendering the decision not an election, functionally 
or constitutionally.  Indeed, the Federal Register that established 
the objection process explicitly referred to a property owner’s 
112. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1970); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969). 
113. See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 55.  The Court noted that the crafting of
judicial standards to defining the relative importance of elections would be 
unfeasible, particularly considering that different values would render a “vital” 
election to one voter as “routine” to another.  Id. 
114. See id. at 55–56.  The Court emphasized that governmental activities
“cannot easily be classified in the neat categories favored by civics texts” and 
to quantify the purpose of elections was judicially “unmanageable.”  Id. 
(quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482 (1968)). 
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objection as a “vote,”115 and the proposed rule continues to do so.116  
Furthermore, while the objection of the majority of the property 
owners within the proposed district functions as a veto to its listing, 
the procedure is nonetheless an election.117  In Eastlake v. Forest 
City Enterprises, Inc., the Court found that a referendum procedure 
allowing citizens to effectively veto zoning modifications was a valid 
election and “a classic demonstration of ‘devotion to democracy.’”118  
Moreover, the Court has not distinguished referenda as 
constitutionally different under the “one person, one vote” 
principle.119 Rather, as in representative elections, the 
constitutionally significant factor is whether “all citizens are 
affected in important ways” by the referendum.120  While there has 
been a recognition that the “discrete” nature of a decision subject to 
a referendum will render some principles in representative 
elections of “limited importance,” this merely results in potential 
“one person, one vote” violations being more easily identified.121   
In evaluating the fairness of elections, the factual background 
and potential effects to the disenfranchised or diluted electorate 
will certainly be of paramount importance and thereby render some 
analogies less potent than others.  However, with such a varied 
background of cases, lessons must be taken from wherever they 
apply.  Instead, the fact that most distinguishes the voting process 
for National Register historic districts is that the make-up of the 
referendum does not come from a local decision, even though it is 
an election taking place at the local level.122  Unlike every other 
case, this is a function of the federal government rather than a local 
115. National Register of Historic Places, 46 Fed. Reg. 56183, 56186 (Nov.
16, 1981). 
116. National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996 (proposed Mar.
1, 2019) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
117. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673, 678–79
(1976). 
118. See id. (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971)).
119. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06 (1969).
120. City of Phoenix, 399 U.S. at 209.
121. See Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430
U.S. 259, 266 (1976). 
122. See 36 C.F.R. 60.6(b)–(d).
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election tailored by local policy makers or through a state 
instrumentality.123 
B. Federal Use of the Proprietary Model Conflicts with Principles
of Federalism
Federalism is the very bedrock of our governmental system, yet 
federalism is an elusive concept in many ways.  The Supreme Court 
has strongly recognized federalism but has often struggled to 
demarcate its enforcement on laws that bring state and federal 
powers into dispute.124  This difficulty is particularly true for local 
governments—while federalism contemplates only realms of state 
and federal sovereignty, local governments must necessarily be 
situated somewhere in the overall conceptualization of stratified 
government structure.125  In the Court’s jurisprudence, this 
recognition is often implicit, yet it is undeniable.126  Such is the case 
for the rationale that underpins the proprietary model because the 
Court’s recognition of the need for such a model draws on federalist 
principles.127 
Furthermore, the National Register itself is an exercise in 
federalism.  A federal construct, the National Register program has 
largely been delegated to SHPOs in its administration, particularly 
with respect to the objection process.128  This delegation is only 
natural because SHPOs and state review boards are more 
competent to make on-the-ground evaluations and oversee any 
objections because they have proximity to the physical and political 
landscape.  As a result, officials at the state and local level largely 
deal with the practical implications and are the target of any debate 
or contention over the listing of the property on the National 
123. See id.
124. Compare Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1976),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) 
(limiting federal interference in spheres of traditional state government 
function), with Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550–52 (declaring federalism exists in the 
structure of our government itself and cannot be judicially enforced).  
125. See Michael Q. Cannon, Comment, The Dual-Faceted Federalism
Framework and the Derivative Constitutional Status of Local Governments, 
2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1585, 1585 (2012). 
126. See id. at 1585–86.
127. See infra Section III.C.
128. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77–78.
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Register.129  SHPOs may be held politically accountable to the 
ridicule that the program produces, despite their inability to 
deviate from a federally mandated framework.  SHPOs are 
understandably concerned because the land-area voting scheme 
would depart from existing statutory language and obligate 
enforcement of a democratically unequal voting scheme.130  
Therefore, the proprietary model should be evaluated in terms of 
both its federalist justifications and its implications on the National 
Register program. 
C. The Proprietary Model’s Creation Relied on Federalist
Principles
“One person, one vote” decisions, from the earliest extension of 
the principle to local elections in Avery, have repeatedly recognized 
the need for localities to have the ability to tailor functions of 
government to suit their peculiar needs.131  While the Court never 
129. An example of this is the years-long controversy over the listing of the
proposed Eastmoreland Historic District in Portland, Oregon.  See Sophie Peel, 
Eastmoreland Historic District Nomination Rejected by National Park Service, 
Again, WILLIAMETTE WEEK (July 24, 2019), https://www.wweek.com/news/
city/2019/07/24/eastmoreland-historic-district-nomination-rejected-by-
national-parks-service-again/ [https://perma.cc/6HUT-8Z6B].  Due to 
uncertainty of how to count property owners within the proposed district, 
particularly after an effort by some objectors to split their properties into 
thousands of separate trusts that the Oregon SHPO initially counted as 
individual votes, the nomination has repeatedly ping-ponged between the 
SHPO and the NPS.  See infra note 206.  While it is dubious whether those 
trusts count as individual votes, or even whether they were validly created, see 
infra note 206, the result is that the Oregon SHPO is stuck between two highly 
partisan neighborhood groups at the local level and the NPS at the national 
level, see Sara Roth, Eastmoreland residents who split homes into shares 




130. See TEX. HISTORICAL COMM’N, Comment Letter on National Park
Service Proposed Rule for the National Register of Historic Places (Apr. 9, 
2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-2019-0001-3304 
[hereinafter Texas Commission Comment]; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS, Comment Letter on National Park Service 
Proposed Rule for the National Register of Historic Places 3 (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-2019-0001-0978 
[https://perma.cc/3N69-3V7C] [hereinafter NCSHPO Comment]. 
131. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968) (“The
Constitution does not require a uniform straitjacket binding citizens in 
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explicitly referenced federalism, examining the proprietary model 
alongside the principles of federalism clearly illustrates that the 
local needs supported by the proprietary model correspond to the 
same benefits afforded to states and localities in our federal 
system.132  These advantages include, among others, a “sensitivity 
to diverse needs,” an “increase[d] opportunity for citizen 
involvement in democratic processes,” and an “allowance for more 
innovation and experimentation in government.”133  All of these 
principles justify localities escaping from the strictures of the “one 
person, one vote” principle where there is a need to diversify, 
experiment, and favor a unique democratic process where 
singularly local issues are being resolved.   
Yet with the proposed land-area voting scheme for National 
Register historic districts, it is not the local citizens acting to tailor 
the voting process to their needs and sensibilities; rather, it is a 
federal agency acting wholesale for the purported benefit of 
property owners in an incommensurable variety of local contexts. 
While such voting processes for local historic districts could 
potentially fit the proprietary model, particularly where the 
decision carries regulatory consequences,134 this escape from the 
voting protections of “one person, one vote” was never meant to be 
a loophole for the federal government to avoid its own governing 
principle of “one person, one vote.”135   
devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient 
in solving local problems.”); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) 
(recognizing the potential for election of “certain functionaries whose duties 
are so far removed and so disproportionately affect different groups that a 
popular election in compliance with [“one person, one vote”] might not be 
required . . . .”). 
132. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citing Michael
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1484, 1491–1511 (1987)).  Professor Briffault views the “proprietary” model as 
a “partial escape from the tension between political equality and federalism,” 
allowing local governments to be considered business entities, but they must 
nonetheless be situated somewhere in the federal system.  See Briffault, supra 
note 7, at 381. 
133. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (citing McConnell, supra note 132, at 1493).
134. See Texas Commission Comment, supra note 130, at 1 (noting that
some municipalities allocate votes for establishing local historic districts on lot 
size). 
135. Even in Ball v. James, where the proprietary model arguably reached
its zenith, the Court made clear that it was only examining the applicability of 
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In addition, the Court’s analysis also demonstrates a reliance 
on federalism concerns in crafting the democratic-proprietary 
paradigm in other ways, particularly in the education context, 
where the Court relied on the traditional governmental functions 
at issue as proof that the powers wielded by the elected entities 
were general in nature and widely affected all constituents.136  In 
turn, the Court contrasted the fact that water districts did not 
engage in traditional governmental functions in crafting the 
proprietary model.137  This type of analysis reflects a line of 
jurisprudence that endeavored to create spheres of state and 
federal power based on defining traditional government 
functions.138  In the context of “one person, one vote,” the exercise 
of traditional governmental functions ironically justifies federal 
interference rather than the protection of state power from that 
interference, as with other uses of this analysis.139  However, the 
Court, relying on differentiating special-purpose districts based on 
traditional governmental functions, suggests the creation of a 
conceptual sub-state entity that, by its uniquely local and 
proprietary nature, justifies further insulation from federal 
control.140  This result comports with the recognition that, while 
the “one person, one vote” principle to “local government bodies.”  451 U.S. 355, 
357 (1981) (emphasis added). 
136. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
137. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973) (“[The water district] provides no other general public 
services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything 
else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body.”). 
138. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) 
(invalidating the extension of federal minimum wage pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause to certain government positions because federalism 
guaranteed states freedom to “structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional governmental functions.”). 
139. See id. at 851–52.
140. See Cannon, supra note 125, at 1585, 1591–93, 1599–1600.
Traditionally, local governments have been viewed as merely state 
instrumentalities, and not independent polities.  See Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177–78 (1907).  However, in Avery, the Court rejected 
the argument that this theory justified a categorical exception of local 
governments from “one person, one vote,” instead it recognized that they do 
enjoy a great deal of autonomy. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 
481 (1968); see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 347–48.  A return to this theory 
of local government does not fully explain the proprietary model, rather, it 
2021] HISTORIC PRESERVATION 223 
the federal government is justified in invading state spheres to 
protect fundamental liberties to a great degree, the “Fourteenth 
Amendment does not override all principles of federalism.”141  
While the Court has disavowed efforts to shape judicial review 
based on bright-line formulations of governmental or proprietary 
functions,142 values of federalism are nevertheless relevant where 
federal law impinges on the exercise of state sovereignty.143  
Fundamentally, the proprietary model rests on a need for 
states and localities to have the freedom necessary to craft political 
functions to address local needs and fit local predilections.  In local 
special-purpose elections, the Court seems to acknowledge the 
importance of crafting additional voting requirements, which have 
been recognized as a legitimate component of state sovereignty,144 
despite such an action being rejected where it conflicts with the 
democratic model under the “one person, one vote” principle.145  
The Court made this exception for proprietary elections because, on 
examining of the peculiarities of a special-purpose district with 
disproportionate impact on certain voters, it recognized that the 
favored group is clearly not, in fact, similarly situated or as 
interested in the election as those who are excluded from an equal 
appears to endorse the existence of another, more locally unique and business-
like, political subdivision.  See Briffault, supra note 7, at 369. 
141. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) (examining a variety
of contexts where deference is given to states in the exercise of “political-
function[s].”). 
142. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550
(1985) (“[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the 
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government 
itself.”).  Although there are certainly competing theories of how federalism 
should be enforced, as a practical matter it proved too difficult for courts to 
define what is and what is not a traditional governmental function.  See 
Briffault, supra note 7, at 381 n.166. 
143. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458, 469.
144. See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) (“[T]he privilege to vote
in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the 
state may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of 
course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the 
Federal Constitution.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I § 4 (“The Times, Places, and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing [sic] Senators.”). 
145. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625–26, 633 (1969).
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franchise.146  By distinguishing elections in the proprietary model 
from those in the democratic model, the Court returns the power 
for states and localities to craft voting requirements to its full effect. 
Because the proprietary model rests on a sphere of sovereignty 
reserved to states,147 the case for a federal exercise of the 
proprietary model is further undercut. 
Even if the federal government can properly utilize the 
proprietary model, the Court has stated that the federal 
government can only invade an area of state sovereignty if Congress 
makes clear its intent to do so in a “plain statement.”148  However, 
the language of the statute unequivocally states that a historic 
district nomination will be blocked only by “a majority of the owners 
of privately owned properties within the district.”149  Therefore, the 
proposed land-area voting scheme is not even a permissible 
construction of an ambiguous provision, but, rather, a direct 
contradiction to the plain language of the statute.  Such an invasion 
of state sovereignty where Congress did not authorize it clearly 
violates the “plain statement” rule.150  
Furthermore, because the SHPOs would enforce this voting 
scheme against their own democratic principles, the proposed rule 
is arguably an impermissible commandeering of state officers to 
enforce a federal regulatory scheme.151  Although federal grants 
largely fund SHPOs, a change to such an important mechanism as 
the nomination of historic districts would affect the fundamental 
character of the historic preservation program.  This is particularly 
true considering the constitutional dimension of acting against the 
fundamental right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause.  The 
ramifications and disapproval for administering such an 
undemocratic system will undoubtedly fall upon the SHPOs and 
allow the federal officers who devised it to escape them.  As such, 
146. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973). 
147. See supra Section III.B.
148. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61.
149. 54 U.S.C. § 302105 (b) (2019) (emphasis added).
150. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61.
151. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–80 (2012);
see also NCSPHO Comment, supra note 130, at 3 (“[The land-area voting 
scheme] essentially affords a more significant voice to those possessing more 
wealth in the form of land⎯a rather feudal concept, and one that has been 
introduced with no justification.”). 
2021] HISTORIC PRESERVATION 225 
the proposed rule is especially capable of a coercive influence if the 
states are not given a legitimate voice.152  Additionally, the 
administration of the land-area voting scheme is an unfunded 
mandate that would likely prove highly burdensome due to the 
difficulties in reliably measuring land area, even if the proposed 
rule or statute defined the term “land area” at all.153  Considering 
the unwarranted and fundamental change to the voting scheme 
along with the administrative burdens it represents, the proposed 
rule can be fairly characterized as a coercion of the states. 
When examining the rationale that created the proprietary 
model alongside accepted principles of federalism that the Court 
endorsed, it becomes clear that this model was contemplated only 
to apply to states and localities that tailor their democratic system 
to meet the peculiarities of local issues.  Furthermore, to the extent 
that principles of federalism are determinative to the exercise of 
federal power in spheres of state sovereignty, there is evidence that 
a federal agency’s use of the proprietary model is improper.  Even 
when applying more concrete doctrines of federalism-based 
limitations, there is ample justification to hold the application of 
the land-area voting scheme as violative of our nation’s federalist 
structure.  However, it is not entirely clear that National Register 
historic district elections would fit the proprietary model at all if 
this use of federal power were permissible. 
D. Historic District Referenda Do Not Fit the Proprietary Model
While the Court was not entirely clear in delineating the test
to determine the line between the democratic and proprietary 
models, some lessons can be pulled from the existing jurisprudence. 
First, it must be determined whether the election involves general 
governmental powers or is only for a special limited purpose.154  
152. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 578 (“Permitting the Federal
Government to force the States to implement a federal program would threaten 
the political accountability key to our federal system.”).  
153. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Comment Letter on
National Park Service Proposed Rule for the National Register of Historic 
Places 5 (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-2019-
0001-1806 [https://perma.cc/CHC4-C2VT] [hereinafter ACHP Comment]. 
154. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728 (1973). 
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Some factors to consider are the scope of the decisions to be made155 
and whether the powers are those local governments traditionally 
exercise.156  Second, it must be determined whether the election 
and its contingent benefits and burdens disproportionately impacts 
the favored voting class.157  To justify diluting a group’s voting 
rights, the voting scheme must overcome a presumption that all 
citizens are “affected in important ways”158 and effectively 
apportion the franchise based on a valid representation of the 
interests of each group.159  Whether the entity can be characterized 
as proprietary in nature is of particular importance.160  Finally, if 
these factors favor an escape from the strict scrutiny of “one person, 
one vote,” there must be a rational basis to show the unequal voting 
scheme does not “nonetheless amount . . . to invidious 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”161  
While this test is certainly not perfect due to the inconsistent 
manner in which the Court has weighed different factors,162 it is a 
workable formulation for applying the “one person, one vote” 
jurisprudence to the National Register historic district elections. 
Indeed, commentators have struggled to nail down an analytical 
framework that provides consistent guidance and, instead, have 
opted to compare and contrast individual cases.163  Yet, the purpose 
of this Comment is not to critique the efficacy of this line of 
155. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968).
156. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
157. See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728–29.
158. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970).
159. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969); see also
Salyer, 410 U.S. at 734 (“[T]he benefits and burdens to each landowner . . . are 
in proportion to the assessed value of the land.” (quoting Salyer v. Tulare Lake 
Basin Water Storage Dist., 342 F.Supp. 144, 146 (1972))). 
160. Briffault, supra note 7, at 372.
161. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 268 (1977). 
162. See Joseph Seliga, Democratic Solutions to Urban Problems, 25
HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2001). 
163. See, e.g., id.; Briffault, supra note 7, at 370–73, 375–76.  Professor
Briffault posited that the disproportionate impact prong may be logically 
circular, as the competing interests that are favored in the franchise will 
necessarily depend on whether the vote is viewed from a democratic or 
proprietary lens.  See id. at 370–71. 
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jurisprudence but to instead apply the available guideposts to a 
discrete voting scheme.  
1. General Governmental Powers Versus Special Limited Purpose
It is self-evident that National Register historic districts do not
exercise the kind of broad powers that the quintessential local city 
or county council would.  The listing of a historic district will not 
result in the various decisions, such as taxation, contracting, and 
spending, that were at issue in Avery.164  As with all referenda, the 
result of the election will be a single discrete decision.  Facially, a 
National Register historic district seems to have only a special 
limited purpose.  The Court has nevertheless recognized that such 
special purpose elections may have wide enough impact to require 
adherence to “one person, one vote.”165  
In the bond referenda cases, the Court noted that increased 
taxation would have wide impact both through direct government 
services and with respect to costs passed from landowners; 
furthermore, the disenfranchised also had a valid interest in the 
election’s outcome.166  While the economic impact of a National 
Register historic district listing is much harder to quantify than 
with taxation, studies show that creating a historic district can 
have a blanket impact on property values.167  In fact, there is 
evidence that historic districts that do not impose property 
restrictions, like the National Register, have a greater net benefit 
even above the “conclusively” positive baseline land value 
increase.168  Furthermore, the owners of properties that contribute 
to the historical significance of the district can accrue direct 
benefits in the form of federal tax incentives.169  Although each 
164. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483–84 (1968); see also
TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 71–72 (illustrating what listing on the National 
Register does and does not do). 
165. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969).
166. See Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. at 210–11.
167. See Paul K. Asabere & Forrest E. Huffman, Historic Districts and Land
Values, 6 J. REAL EST. RES. 1, 1 (1991); Donald A. Coffin, The Impact of Historic 
Districts on Residential Property Values, 15 E. ECON. J. 221, 221 (1989). 
168. Asabere & Huffman, supra note 167, at 5–6.
169. See Ejulius Adorno, Note, Historic Preservation: Incentivizing
Companies Through Tax Credits, 43 IOWA J.  CORP. L. 143, 147–48 (2017) 
(focusing on the federal rehabilitation tax credit); Jess R. Phelps, Preserving 
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historic district is unique, there is no indication that these impacts 
would not widely affect all property owners within a historic 
district.  Even where impacts are less defined, as other impacts of 
historic district listing may be, the exercise of a traditional 
government function can provide a guidepost. 
The type of governmental power that underpins the creation of 
a historic district is most readily characterized as a land use or 
zoning function.  While not among the traditional governmental 
functions enumerated in Salyer,170 land use and zoning are 
functions vital to local governments of general power.  In fact, in 
Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, the Court applied 
the “one person, one vote” principle to the election of a 
governmental unit whose powers included land use and zoning171 
and even extended to designating local historic districts.172  This 
application further suggests that zoning and land use fall within 
traditional government function, despite the Board of Estimate’s 
powers being broad enough to determine that it wielded general 
governmental powers without needing to rely on the traditional 
functions to show wide-spread impact.173  
Even when independently analyzed, zoning and land use 
decisions are undoubtedly the kind that have wide impact on the 
community.  Indeed, there is an argument that the most important 
power vested in local governments is control over land use 
decisions, which is often reflected through the passionate discourse 
over how these decisions will affect the future of a community.174  
Zoning and land use decisions determine where citizens can live 
and own property, run their businesses, send their children to 
school, and even change the physical landscape of the community 
writ large.  A wider level of impact can scarcely be contemplated. 
Perpetuity?: Exploring the Challenges of Perpetual Preservation in an Ever-
Changing World, 43 ENVTL. L. 941, 961–62 (2013) (discussing the requirements 
for the federal historic preservation easement tax deduction). 
170. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973). 
171. See Bd. of Estimate of City of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 695–96
(1989). 
172. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 111
(1978). 
173. See Morris, 489 U.S. at 695–96, 702–03.
174. Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in Making
Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 301–02 (2002). 
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The decision to list a historic district on the National Register will 
not have the same impact as local district zoning and land use 
decisions. Nevertheless, that decision makes an important 
statement about the values that property owners within the 
proposed district hold, opens up an array of potential benefits to 
property values, gives access to federal tax incentives, and provides 
a template for further local decisions about the nature of the district 
itself.175 
Despite indications of the wide impact from the decision to list 
a historic district and its similarities to a traditional government 
function, this factor may weigh more toward the election being for 
a special limited purpose.  Even where the Court has relied on 
instances of a traditional government function to require “one 
person, one vote,” the government entity often exercised additional 
broader powers.176  Furthermore, the Court has most consistently 
used this analysis in the context of education177 and overlooked 
seemingly vital government functions as incidental or non-
traditional in other contexts,178 indicating that education may be a 
special case.179  To justify adopting the proprietary model, however, 
evidence must also illustrate that the dilution of the franchise 
corresponds to a disproportionate impact on the favored class of 
voters. 
2. Disproportionate Impact
As the name of the proprietary model suggests, whether the
function of the election can be fairly characterized as a business––
with the favored voting group being entitled to a greater say over 
its operation because they act as shareholders who bear the costs of 
running the enterprise––is highly consequential.  The importance 
of this distinction was explicit in Ball’s exhortation that water 
175. See supra Section I.A. and notes 167-69.
176. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53–54, 56 (1970).
177. See, e.g., id. at 56.  The Illinois Supreme Court continued to find the
democratic model applicable to school boards even after the development of the 
proprietary model, relying once again on education as a “traditional and vital 
government function.”  Fumarolo v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1296 
(Ill. 1990). 
178. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981).
179. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 356.
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districts were “essentially . . . business enterprise[s].”180  This 
distinction allowed a rebuttal of the presumption applied in 
previous “one person, one vote” cases under the democratic model 
that it was improper to exclude voters who also had valid interests 
in the outcome of the election, despite the decisional autonomy of 
water districts and the large number of affected residents in 
Ball.181  The particularities of water district functions and the 
corresponding valuation of costs being associated directly with the 
size or value of the land owned within the district also gave 
sufficient grounds to find that the unequal voting scheme reflected 
the interests of each landowner in the relative weight of their voting 
power.182  As a result, the associated pecuniary interests of each 
landowner gave more reliable criteria for weighing each voter’s 
interests and thereby circumscribes Kramer’s delineation of 
“interest.”183 
Elections over the listing of a National Register historic district 
include none of these important distinctions.  Certainly, a historic 
district cannot be characterized as a proprietary entity because 
property owners within the proposed district do not have a 
proportional pecuniary impact or interest based on their 
corresponding land holdings.  For instance, the water district in 
Ball had an acreage-based taxing power and funded its operation 
through stock assessments, arguably requiring franchise power in 
proportion to those real-world consequences.184  One may argue 
that the land area of the proposed historic district itself, when 
broken up among property owners, could act as the conceptual 
“shares.”  While it may be true that those with larger land might 
generally accrue greater land value benefits, those benefits would 
not be proportional to the overall land area but instead correlate to 
the property’s characteristics, location, use, zoning, and other 
factors.185  Furthermore, the Court has been clear in applying the 
proprietary model that these distinctions must nevertheless 
180. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 368.
181. See id. at 369–70.
182. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 729–30 (1973). 
183. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
184. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 359–60.
185. See Asabere & Huffman, supra note 167, at 3–5; Coffin, supra note 167,
at 221–22. 
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correspond to the functions of the district itself.186  Nowhere is 
there a function of National Register historic districts that would 
justify a valuation of votes based on land area.  Indeed, “land area” 
is not a term within the authorizing statute or existing 
regulation.187  In fact, its first introduction is in the proposed rule 
itself.188   
Even accepting arguendo that property restrictions placed at 
the state or local levels are implicated on the National Register, 
they will not fall more heavily over one property owner than 
another based on the land area involved.  The restrictions 
associated with local historic districts may limit demolition, 
construction, repair, and renovation subject to review by a local 
zoning board or historic district commission.189  Such restrictions, 
while potentially very onerous to the non-preservation minded 
property owner, do not fall more heavily on property owners based 
on the relative size of their property.  The most likely way in which 
these restrictions would fall more heavily on certain property 
owners is where the property itself was more historically significant 
or highly valued in the community, prompting greater scrutiny over 
the treatment of the property.  Yet, the National Register itself does 
not even carry these burdens associated with locally designated 
historic districts.190 
In fact, listing on the National Register is more fairly 
characterized as not carrying any constitutionally significant 
burdens on property owners at all.  Although the research 
necessary to prove a property’s historical significance often requires 
a paid professional, because any person can nominate a property, 
these costs do not necessarily even fall on the property owner, let 
alone each property owner within a proposed district.  Furthermore, 
the few effects to property owners that can be characterized as 
186. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 371 (“[T]he question [is] whether the effect of the
entity’s operations on [property owners is] disproportionately greater than the 
effect on those seeking the vote.” (emphasis added)). 
187. See supra notes 42, 52 and accompanying text.
188. See ACHP Comment, supra note 153, at 5.
189. Anika Singh Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood
Conservation Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L. J. 1525, 1582 
(2015).  The most widely regarded principles governing the treatment of 
historic properties come from the Secretary of Interior’s Standards for 
Rehabilitation.  36 C.F.R. § 68.3(b). 
190. See supra note 45–47 and accompanying discussion.
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drawbacks are incidental at best.191  In contrast, the benefits of 
listing on the National Register, as previously discussed, may be 
substantial and fall widely over all properties within the historic 
district.192  However, there is no evidence that either these benefits 
or burdens—to the extent that they exist—fall more heavily on 
larger property owners in proportion with the size of their land.  
Clearly, the disproportionate impact prong weighs strongly in 
favor of adherence to the “one person, one vote” principle to 
National Register historic district elections.  Although these 
historic districts may likely be considered as having only a special 
limited purpose, these two factors, on the balance, weigh towards 
the land-area voting scheme being unconstitutional.  That being 
said, because of the inconsistent application of these principles in 
the Court’s jurisprudence, it is difficult to predict the outcome 
where the background is novel.193  However, even if the proposed 
election scheme were to be permissible under the proprietary 
model, there is yet an argument that it bears no rational relation to 
the operation or aims of the National Register. 
3. The Land-Area Voting Scheme Under Rational Basis
Once an election is found to fit the proprietary model, the
unequal election scheme is valid so long as it is not “wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of the regulation’s objectives.”194  
While the Court has always found a rational basis for justifying an 
unequal election where it has found a proper use of the proprietary 
model, it has also provided some basic guidelines to support a 
rational basis.  One consistent justification is that allowing the 
dilution of some votes is grounded in the “realities” of the 
underlying government unit or controversy.195  Additionally, the 
voting requirements must still provide a reasonable relationship to 
191. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
194. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 730 (1973) (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs for Port of 
New Orleans, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)). 
195. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1977); Salyer, 410 U.S. at 734, 268–69, 734 (1977). 
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the operations of the underlying governmental entity or decision to 
be made.196 
In both Salyer and Ball, the manner in which the votes were 
weighted was based on how the costs were shared or the 
corresponding benefits received, allowing the Court to find a 
rational relationship to the voting scheme.197  The unique 
challenges and needs of these water storage districts were the 
realities that justified the creation of the proprietary model.198 
However, no such realities exist with National Register historic 
districts.  If any group understands the realities of running our 
nation’s historic preservation program, it is the SHPOs.  Yet, when 
this voting scheme was proposed, they were left baffled because it 
was “unclear what problem this rule change is attempting to solve” 
and there is “no justification” for smaller property owners’ votes to 
be diluted as such.199  This confusion provides further support that 
historic district listing does not, in fact, have any such burdens or 
benefits that would justify finding even a rational basis. 
Furthermore, in Ball, the Court held that weighing the vote 
based on acreage bore a reasonable relationship to the overall 
operation of the water district.200  Here, justifying the land-area 
voting scheme by “emphasiz[ing] the rights of private property 
owners within a proposed historic district”201 has seemingly little 
relation to the underlying operation of the National Register itself. 
Instead, the concept that land area is the proper quotient for 
valuing and measuring the rights of property owners within the 
proposed district is arbitrary.202  And, what are the “rights” that 
the land-area voting scheme are meant to “emphasize”?  Under a 
property theory, the form of ownership with the most rights in its 
196. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981).
197. See id.; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 734.
198. See, e.g., Ball, 451 U.S. 371 (basing the holding on the “narrow”
functions of the water district and its “relationship” to its “statutory 
objectives”). 
199. See NCSHPO Comment, supra note 130, at 3.
200. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
201. Proposed Regulations on the Listing of Properties in the National
Register of Historic Places, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/historicpreservation/nhparegs2019.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5AVX-N37A] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020). 
202. See ACHP Comment, supra note 153, at 5.
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proverbial “bundle of sticks” is fee simple.203  Having a larger parcel 
of land does not grant the owner greater rights than a smaller 
neighbor, and it certainly does not grant him an entitlement to have 
an outsized voice over how that neighbor wishes to exercise his own 
rights. 
By valuing a voter’s interest based on land holdings, with 
seemingly little justification for doing so, the land-area voting 
scheme conflicts with the conceptualization of a voter’s “interest” in 
an election under Kramer, even under a rational basis test.204  
Kramer defined interest in an election of community concern as 
being something personal to the voter, not necessarily defined only 
by pecuniary interest in the form of property ownership.205  Only 
through reframing the government entity as a business enterprise 
could the Court narrow its definition of “interest” and thereby tie 
that interest to the conceptual “shares” each landowner held. 
Because the interest in the underlying proposed historic district can 
scarcely be characterized as a proprietary one, it is not rational to 
define a property owner’s interest in the election in this manner. 
Instead, the land-area voting scheme allows for a large property 
owner who simply receives notice that his property is located in a 
proposed historic district and decides to object with a greater voice 
than a property owner who is informed about local history and 
wishes to celebrate and promote the community’s heritage.  
CONCLUSION 
The land-area voting scheme proposed for the nomination of 
National Register historic district stands against our nation’s 
fundamental principles of democracy.  Such an election dilutes a 
citizen’s fundamental interest in their right to vote, guaranteed 
under the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection 
Clause, by virtue of nothing more than their relative wealth in land 
holdings compared to their neighbors.  Although the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence allows some local elections to depart from the 
203. See Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 12 (2017).
204. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 631–33 (1969).
205. See id. at 632; see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 355 (“[T]he Court’s
use of the term ‘interest’ . . . suggests that the relevant interests were 
subjective states of mind, rather than objective ties to school board operations.” 
(quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 630)). 
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protections of “one person, one vote” by virtue of the special limited 
purpose of the election and its disproportionate impact on the 
favored voters, that proprietary model of local government is not 
justified here.  The proprietary model was not fashioned or 
contemplated as a means for the federal government to violate its 
own tenets.  Instead, that model has its roots in principles of 
federalism that justify state and local governments taking actions 
that the federal government cannot.  Furthermore, the use of the 
proprietary model here runs afoul of federalism-based doctrines on 
the division of state and federal power.  
Even if federalism alone would not prohibit a federal agency’s 
use of this model, the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that historic 
district elections do not fit into the proprietary model and must be 
examined under the strict scrutiny generally provided when 
examining potential violation of the “one person, one vote” 
principle.  Even under a rational basis test, a disconnect exists 
between the manner in which votes are apportioned and the 
operation of the National Register program itself—demonstrating 
that the dilution of the smaller property owner’s franchise is not 
reasonably related to the justifications given. 
While the existing one property owner, one vote election 
scheme is not perfect,206 it represents the most reasonable process 
under the particular circumstance of National Register 
nominations.  The voting qualifications to object require being a 
landowner within the proposed district; however, the franchise is 
still vested with the citizen—not the land itself—irrespective of the 
relative size of each property.  The same cannot be said for the 
proposed land-area voting scheme, which flouts the foundational 
206. One potential problem became clear in the 2017 proposal for the
Eastmoreland Historic District in Portland, Oregon.  The objecting property 
owners were able to defeat the listing, at least temporarily, by devising their 
landholdings into thousands of separate trusts.  See Joy Beasley, 
Memorandum on the Proposed Eastmoreland Historic District, Portland, 
Oregon, NAT’L PARK SERV., 2 (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.oregon.gov/oprd/OH/Documents/NPS%20
Return%20Letter%207.19.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZFJ-YS48] (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2020). While the Oregon SHPO and Department of Justice 
determined that these trusts were valid for the purposes of the objection, the 
NPS disagreed, and there is still a significant question as to whether the trusts 
themselves were validly held, even if they could be considered individual 
owners under the regulation.  See id. at 3–5. 
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principle in Reynolds that the right to vote is enjoyed by the 
citizen.207 
Therefore, the proposed land-area voting scheme should be 
rejected as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and elections 
to determine the listing of historic districts to the National Register 
must remain on a “one person, one vote” basis.  
207. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
